S torage and handling of dangerous chemicals in plants adjacent to populated areas pose major threats against public health and safety. At Ikonio harbour, the main goods depot of Piraeus harbour and one of the biggest commercial ports in Greece, huge quantities of chemicals among other goods are unloaded and stored in marshalling yards and warehouses very close to an inhabited zone of the region. In this task, several accidental scenarios based on real data are presented and the effects on the residential area are quantitatively estimated. The results show that an eventual accident will extensively damage the surroundings, even causing significant fatalities in the affected population.
INTRODUCTION
Enormous quantities of dangerous chemicals are daily produced and transferred by road, rail or, more frequently, ships. Cargoes are usually unloaded and temporarily kept in marshalling yards and warehouses for intermediate storage and further transport. Especially in port areas, where the quantities of unshipping goods are the largest, there is a significant possibility of accident occurrence with extensive consequences for both humans and the environment. Thus, among conveyance modes, 54.8% of transportation accidents occurring in the last 60 years have happened in sea ports (Christou, 1999) . Moreover, their proximity to population centres for practical reasons often leads to increased numbers of injuries and fatalities.
Sea-going batches of goods are usually enclosed in portable containers, whose capacity ranges typically from 15 to 30 m 3 . Rupture of a container may be caused by dropping from the crane during loading=unloading on a ship, by collision of a transport vehicle with it, overheating due to an adjacent fire and hence overpressure, or fatigue (Rao and Raghavan, 1996; CCPS, 1995a) . Corrosion of metallic vessels, hot repair works like welding and external factors (lightning, extremely high temperatures, airplane drop) can also cause an accident. However, waterfront facilities engaged in marine transfer operations are governed by specific regulations which impose appropriate safety measures for hazardous cargoes handled within them (CCPS, 1988) , and specific methodologies are suggested to accommodate risk management works in such places (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000) .
At Piraeus Harbour Organization (PHO) storage area, data reveal that numerous hazardous chemicals (flammable and toxic) are stored in large quantities near the inhabited zone of Ikonio suburb, where building blocks, a public school and a highway connecting Ikonio with Piraeus city are found. Containers of toxic and flammable substances are densely situated outdoors without sufficient stand-off distances between them. A potential accident could directly endanger residents' and students' health and lives and, depending on the type of accident, cause at the same time heavy property damage.
Prediction and consequence assessment of eventual accidents is not easy to accomplish, due to the uncertainty of the kind and the amount of hazardous materials present at a certain time and place. Nevertheless, typical scenarios of possible accidents can be developed considering the maximum quantities of typical dangerous substances often arriving at the port. Quantification of risk and consequence assessment associated with accidents involving hazardous materials has been successfully carried out in previous work (Spadoni et al., 2003; Tixier et al., 2002; Ditali et al., 2000; Khan and Abbasi, 1999) by the use of software packages which incorporate empirical models. In the present work, undesirable events like toxic dispersion, fire and cloud explosion were computed by quantitative models contained in the BREEZE HAZARD software package. Depending on the type of accident investigated in each scenario, the levels of substance concentration, thermal radiation intensity or overpressure were computed at the distances of interest, leading to impact assessments on defined percentages of the affected population.
categories: dispersion, fire and explosion. The types of accidents investigated in this work are briefly described below.
Dispersion of Toxic Vapors or Gaseous Fire Products
Accidental releases of poisonous gases are followed either by dispersion and atmospheric scattering if lighter than air or by dispersion and drop to the ground if heavier than air. In the latter case, the gas occurs in high concentrations at relatively low heights and therefore is able to harmfully affect a larger percentage of neighbouring residents. In addition to the chemical properties of the substance released, dispersion is a function of a number of external factors, such as atmospheric stability, temperature, humidity, surface roughness and wind speed. In proportion to the type of released gas (heavier or lighter than air), the appropriate model should be used.
A hazardous gas cloud can also be composed of the emissions of a fuel pool fire. A typical example of such fuels is pesticides, which yield a series of combustion products, usually differentiated in kind and quantity (Kinsman and Maddison, 2001) . Highly toxic compound production and dispersion is an individual risk arising from a fire and should be separately investigated.
Pool Fire
When a flammable liquid spills to the ground an ignitable pool is formed, able to catch fire on meeting an ignition source. The type of the fire is 'confined' when the pool has developed in limited space (e.g. in a warehouse) and 'unconfined' when it has developed in an open area (e.g. in a yard). In the latter case the fire is supplied with unlimited amounts of air and approximates the conditions of perfect combustion.
The major hazards during a pool fire are the production and dispersion of toxic gases, in addition to thermal radiation emitted. Sufficiently high levels of heat radiation may cause rupture of adjacent vessels and ignition to their contents, if flammable. This phenomenon is known as the domino effect and contributes to increased degree of damage.
Fireball and UVCE
Rupture of pressurized vessels is followed by massive release of their contents into the atmosphere. If the escaping gas is flammable, its turbulent mixing with air leads to the rapid formation of a cloud with fire or even explosive properties. In the presence of an appropriate ignition source, the cloud will form a burning sphere (fireball) emitting heat radiation, or explode in the open air producing a blast wave (unconfined vapor cloud explosion, UVCE).
In the latter case, the combustion is sustained by a shockwave, which propagates at the leading edge of the combustion front (detonative combustion). The propagation speed is principally restricted by the concentration of fuel and maximized when the oxygen percentage within the cloud approximates the 'zero oxygen balance' (stoichiometric fuel-air mixture), simultaneously developing the maximum overpressure (Philips, 1994) . The requisite for a VCE initiation is that the gas concentration falls to within its explosion limits, which sometimes are stricter than and sometimes are equal to the flammability limits.
COMPUTATIONAL TOOLS
All models used in this task for consequence assessment of typical accident scenarios are included in BREEZE HAZARD software package, which contains several models capable of simulating all types of accidents: dispersion, fire and explosion. The models used in the current accident scenarios are described below.
EXPERT Model
Dispersion models require data related to the source of the release. Such data are the temperature and density at the orifice area, release duration and the release rate with which a gas or aerosol escapes into the atmosphere. The EXPERT model calculates these source-term parameters based on user-specified chemical property data of the escaping substance, type of storage equipment (shape, size and orientation), storage conditions and orifice size (Grosch and Miller, 1998) .
The final results are automatically transferred to the appropriate dispersion model, depending upon the release type (heavier or lighter than air) and orientation (horizontal or vertical).
SLABþ and DEGADISþ Models
The SLABþ model simulates the atmospheric dispersion of denser-than-air releases in the following accidental situations: a ground level evaporating pool (continuous or of finite duration); an elevated horizontal jet (continuous or of finite duration); an instantaneous volume source.
SLAB is a chop model that averages the cloud properties in the horizontal and vertical directions within the flow field and is thus one-dimensional. It is based on a set of six ordinary differential equations of downwind distance which describe the conservation of mass, momentum and energy (Lees, 1996) .
The DEGADISþ model is also applied for dense gas releases and treats all the above situations plus ground level transient releases by elaborating them as a series of quasisteady-state releases. It is consistent with passive dispersion principles as the cloud density approaches ambient density Havens, 1996, 1987) .
Both models assume a flat atmospheric flow field with no obstructions, such us buildings or trees, and do not take into account sloping terrain. However, they approach the effects of obstructions by taking into account the overall surface roughness, typical values for which may be found in the literature (CCPS, 1995b) . The roughness value applied in our computations (0.18) is relatively low compared with the proposed ones (0.2-0.3 for outskirts), resulting in rather conservative estimates. This value was chosen because no buildings are found between the PHO installations and the built-up area. The main difference between them is that DEGADISþ does not incorporate horizontal jet release velocity and is therefore excluded from horizontal jet releases, where SLABþ can be applied.
Regardless of the release type, the magnitude of a toxic substance dispersion effect will be determined from the total dose value at specific receptor points. Once the substance concentration variation with time is known at a particular point, the total dose is given directly by the integration:
where C ¼ toxic substance concentration (mg m À3 or ppm) and t 7 t 0 ¼ time duration of cloud pass above a point.
Unconfined Pool Fire Model
This model performs calculations associated with pool fires in unconfined area (e.g. around a ruptured container) based on empirical formulations (CCPS, 1999 (CCPS, , 2000 and contains two calculation modules:
calculation of radiation at various specified distances from the center of the pool and the distance to various specified radiation levels; calculations of the thermal intensity rise on a nearby structure, such as a neighbouring tank wall or structured steel column, exposed to the thermal radiation emitted from the pool fire.
Input data needed for the use of this model are the pool shape and dimensions, construction material of the target and the distance between the target and the centre of the pool.
BLEVE Model
Computations of thermal radiation emission due to a fireball event are carried out through this model. In addition to the fireball diameter and duration (considered functions of the net fuel mass), the BLEVE model calculates the thermal dose that affects on heat radiation receptors at distances specified by the user (CCPS, 2000) .
The thermal radiation dose (RD) either for a pool fire or a fireball is determined by the equation:
where t ¼ duration of exposure and q ¼ radiation intensity (W m À2 ). Concerning a pool fire event, a conservative value of 60 s exposure is adopted. On the other hand, a fireball event lasts for a very small time interval and is therefore differentiated from a long-lasting burning pool with regard to fire and exposure duration. In this case, the time of exposure equals the fireball duration.
TNO Multi-energy and TNT Equivalency Explosion Model
The Multi-energy method is based on the concept that strong blast is generated only by those portions which burn under intensely turbulent conditions and treats the explosive potential of the vapour cloud as a number of equivalent fuel-air charges (Crowl, 2003; CCPS, 1996) . Thus, the vapour cloud explosion is modelled as a series of subexplosions with each one corresponding to a potential blast source within the cloud. Practical examples of potential strong blast centres in VCEs are high-velocity jet releases from pressurized tanks or pipes and densely sequential objects such as a series of containers.
In the TNT Equivalency method, the available energy in the vapour cloud is converted into an equivalent charge weight of TNT. As a result, explosive potential is primarily determined by the amount of fuel present in the cloud. However, TNT charge produces a shock wave of very high amplitude and short duration, while a gas explosion produces a blast wave of relatively lower amplitude and longer duration. This difference between TNT and gas explosions makes the TNT Equivalency model suitable for far-field damage estimation, in contrast with the Multienergy model, which can be employed in order to predict near-field damage (CCPS, 1994) . Both models are capable of calculating the distance to various overpressure levels entered by the user.
GENERATION OF ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
For successful accident scenario development and simulation, there are some particular issues that need a more precise approach. These issues include but are not restricted to materials indication, storage areas registration and the location of possible affected areas. The procedures followed are discussed below.
Hazard Spotting
Hazard spotting has to do with the identification of risk sources inside a plant, namely storage points (indoors or outdoors) and kinds and quantities of dangerous materials kept. Among the goods that are frequently unloaded in the docks of PHO at Ikonio, we distinguish the following chemicals that possess dangerous properties: ethyl chloride (maximum quantity per batch 5000 kg), toluene (maximum quantity per batch 30,000 kg) and the pesticide furadan (5000 kg).
Ethyl chloride is a heavier than air gas at ordinary conditions (20 C and 1 atm) and is usually shipped under pressure in liquid form. Vapours are moderately toxic, causing smarting of the eyes and the respiratory system when inhaled. It is also flammable, with a low flash point (À45 C), and its vapours form an explosive mixture with air (explosive limits 3.8-15%; Cheremisinoff, 2000) . Toluene is a highly flammable liquid (flash point 4 C), whose vapours are heavier than air and may therefore travel considerable distances to a source of ignition and flash-back. It may accumulate static electrical charges and hence vapours may ignite (Pohanish and Green, 1997) . Furadan is an agrochemical product sold as a granular pesticide containing 10% w=w of its active component carbofuran. This is an active odourless white crystalline powder, which under fire conditions yields the highly toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC; Nivolianitou, 1998) .
In Figure 1 , an aerial photo of Ikonio area is displayed, where buildings 1 and 2 represent the warehouses of the installation. As is easily discerned, many containers are stored outdoors without sufficient distances between them, Trans IChemE, Part B, Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 2004, 82(B4): 1-11 MAJOR HAZARDS ANALYSIS 3 exposed to a number of external factors that can lead to an accident initiation. It is of vital importance to underline that accident mitigation measures can hardly be applied in large open areas; a rather uncontrollable situation would be expected.
Potentially Affected Areas
In Figure 1 , building blocks that may be targets in case of an accident are shown with buildings 4 and 5, whereas the public school of the area is building 3. In the same figure, building 6 shows the avenue which connects Ikonio with Piraeus. The scale (1=10,000) and North are also shown in the figure. Warehouse 1 is 71 m from block 5, 80 m from the school and 300 m from block 4. Warehouse 2 is 182 m from block 5, 133 m from the school and 310 m from block 4.
Weather Conditions
The change in wind direction during a period of time requires the use of meteorological data in order to determine the prevailing winds in the region of Ikonio. In the case of a toxic gas release, the prevailing southeast to south wind favours the movement of the toxic cloud towards the school and the surrounding building blocks. More precisely, with regard to gas release with a southeast wind (direction 100-110 ), the cloud will affect the school (building 3) and the houses nearest to the school in the same direction (block 4). In the case of a southerly wind (direction 175-185 ), the cloud will affect the nearest warehouse (block 5).
Statistical data for the Piraeus area obtained from the Greek National Meteorological Agency confirm that a southerly wind prevails in April to June, while a southeasterly wind occurs mainly in April and May. In all the other months frequencies of a southerly wind are moderate to low and that of a southeasterly wind low. Through the same data, an average value of wind speed in April and May is equal to 1.8 m s
À1
, while a typical value of relative air humidity is 62.5%.
The general process followed in accident scenarios layout and consequence assessment is illustrated in Figure 2 . In accordance with the dangerous properties of the selected materials during the hazard spotting process, the following reasonable scenarios were investigated:
(1) ethyl chloride release and dispersion (southeasterly and southerly wind); (2) ethyl chloride fireball; (3) ethyl chloride unconfined vapour cloud explosion; (4) toluene pool fire; (5) production and dispersion of methyl isocyanate during the thermal decomposition of the pesticide furadan (southeasterly and southerly wind).
Probabilities of occurrence of the individual accident scenarios may be found in the Lees (1996) and recent papers (Ronza et al., 2003) . On the basis of that data, it could be said that, once an accidental release takes place, it will probably be followed by gas cloud dispersion (probability 0.051), whilst cloud fires and explosions seem to possess a significant likelihood of occurrence (probabilities 0.023 and 0.011, respectively). Fires are less common than releases in their sum (probabilities 0.239 and 0.420, respectively), ) highlight the significant probabilities of occurrence of port accidental events (CCPS, 2001 ). The analysis of the effect on people and property of potential accidental incidents is attempted in the following section, where each scenario is operated with the appropriate computational model.
ACCIDENT SIMULATION-DAMAGE EFFECT ANALYSIS Scenario 1: Ethyl Chloride Dispersion
In this scenario, a vessel containing 5000 kg of ethyl chloride under pressure is assumed to rupture, releasing its contents to the atmosphere. Rupture may be partial or fullbore, leading to a jet-type release of finite duration or an instantaneous discharge. The former demands the use of a source term model, which will provide source term parameters estimation for the dispersion simulation, whereas the latter can be directly computed with the appropriate dispersion model.
Finite duration jet release
The application of the EXPERT model gives the results in Table 1 . The values are automatically transferred to the SLAB model, which calculates the change of gas concentration with time at specified points ( Figure 3 ). Concentration isopleths are displayed in Figures 4 and 5 and represent concentrations of 2600, 10,200 and 100,000 mg m À3 . The first value is the threshold limit value-time-weighted average (TLV-TWA), the second one the immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) value and the third one the lower flammable limit (LFL) of the substance. Maximum distances of marked concentrations were calculated as 83, 13 and 2 m, respectively. Total ethyl chloride doses at the points of interest were calculated from Figure 3 Figure 3 . Change of ethyl chloride concentration with time at specified points 3-5 for horizontal jet release. Total dose values are high enough to cause poisoning symptoms such as tremor, irritation of eyes and skin, central nervous system depression, lung injury and anaesthesia.
Instantaneous release
For the immediate escape of the stored material, the SLAB model calculates the concentration changes at the points of interest, as shown in Figure 6 . At this time, the maximum distances of marked concentrations take the values of 245, 116 and 23 m (Figure 7) , which are significantly larger than those for long-lasting release. Obviously, the rapid gas escape does not allow easy dilution of the cloud with fresh air and, hence, certain concentrations act over larger distances. Total doses are calculated again through integration: 
À3
The obtained results indicate again that total doses at points of interest would cause severe damage to affected people's health.
Scenario 2: Ethyl Chloride Fireball
The escaping ethyl chloride forms a flammable gaseous mixture in the open air (inner contour in Figrues 4, 5 and 7). In this scenario, it is assumed that the ignition of the mixture results in a fireball event. The model BLEVE provides the duration of the fireball (7.7 s) and its radius (48 m). Thermal radiation intensity isopleths are displayed in Figure 8 , representing the standard radiation values of Table 2. In the same table, thermal doses were calculated on the basis of the real time of 7.7 s.
From Figure 8 , it is clear that the part of the avenue adjacent to warehouse 1 would be enclosed inside the burning sphere; in fact, there is no survival likelihood for pedestrians walking along the avenue at the time of the incident. Furthermore, serious burn injuries are predicted for block 5 and the school (mainly second and third degree). Block 4 is out of the danger zone. Considering the radiation intensity value of 500 W m À2 , the corresponding distance calculated by the model is equal to 920 m. Thus, the resulting radiation will be perceptible approximately 1 km from the point of incident. RIGAS and SKLAVOUNOS
Scenario 3: Ethyl Chloride Vapor Cloud Explosion
This type of accident was simulated by the Multi-energy explosion model. Three values of overpressure were given as levels of concern ( Figure 9 ): 300 kPa (inner contour), 51 kPa (middle contour) and 3.5 kPa (outer contour). The first value of overpressure is fatal, the second one results in a 5% probability of fatal injury due to collision of the victim with a stable surface and the third value sets an overpressure level tolerated by humans.
Calculation of resulting overpressure at points of interest (CCPS, 1999; TNO, 1989 ) gave rise to the following conclusions: considering the avenue (block 6), pedestrians would be fatally struck by the overpressure wave (Table 3) . Moreover, taking into account that loaded train carriages turn over at 51 kPa overpressure, passing cars would certainly turn over. Concerning block 5, the overpressure level would cause the collapse of more than 75% of the outer walls, while total destruction of the buildings is possible. The probability of damage to hearing (ear drum rupture) is 40%. With regard to the school, heavy structural damage is expected with the collapse of some walls; ear drum rupture probability is 30%. For both block 5 and the school there is a 50-80% probability of injury and 20-50% probability of being fatally crushed by the crumbling walls. In block 4, the overpressure wave would cause significant damage to outer walls, breakage of windows and partial roof collapses, making the houses uninhabitable. At this distance there is no likelihood of serious injury.
In addition, minor damage to property is still possible at 1 kPa overpressure, namely failure of window panes, noticeable damage to roofs. The TNT Equivalency model (appropriate for estimating far-field damage) computed that this value would be developed at a distance of 1055 m. As a result, undesirable explosion consequences should be expected over a relatively large radius.
Scenario 4: Toluene Pool Fire
In this scenario a toluene tank is assumed to rupture. The content spills to the ground and the pool formed catches fire, provided that an ignition source is available. The appropriate model for simulating this accident is the Unconfined Pool Fire. Two calculations were performed: thermal doses affecting the blocks and the school, plus the thermal load affecting an adjacent container of the same cargo, which is considered to be found 5 m alongside. The distances between points of incident and targets 3-6 are 368, 395, 460 and 360 m, respectively.
Thermal radiation intensity equal to 1.5 kW m À2 is taken as a critical value for human injury and constitutes the threshold limit value for first-degree burns. Moreover, radiation levels of 7 and 17 kW m À2 were considered. Assuming exposure duration equal to the conservative value of 60 s, the former radiation level corresponds to 32% probability for third-degree burns, 43% for second-degree burns and 25% for first-degree burns, , middle contour (high risk); 128.6 Â 10 3 W m À2 , inner contour (lethal effect). whereas the latter level corresponds to 99% probability of fatal injury. The results shown in Table 4 and visualized in Figure 10 denote that there are no harmful effects outside the plant boundaries if only one tank catches fire. On the other hand, the calculated radiation intensity on the second tank exceeds the value of 100 kW m À2 , which corresponds to the critical heat radiation for steel surface rupture (TNO, 1989) . As a result, the tank content will then spill to the ground with simultaneous ignition. In this case, risk radius changes dramatically, enclosing the school and part of the avenue (Figure 11 ).
The effective separation distance for avoiding the domino effect is computed via the above model to be equal to 15 m. In the case of a fire, one should keep in mind the standard practice of cooling the tanks close to fires as a primary action, independently of the precaution measures taken.
Scenario 5: MIC Dispersion
In this scenario, methyl isocyanate is produced and released into the atmosphere, during the combustion of pesticide furadan. For a southeasterly wind, the MIC cloud would affect the school and block 4, while a southerly wind would affect block 5 (Figures 12 and 13) . Total doses are calculated with the aid of Figure 14 . Comparing the total doses at points 3-5 with these values we conclude that TD 5 > TD 3 > LD 50 and LD 10 < TD 4 < LD 50 . Consequently, more than 50% of the affected people would die at points 3 and 5, while the percentage of mortality would barely exceed 10% at point 4. Damage effects arising through consequence analysis of possible accidents at Ikonio's marshalling yards are summarized in Table 5 . The results of the consequence assessment procedure infer the major danger that students and inhabitants would experiences if an accident occurred. Several accident mitigation measures could be adopted in the case of Ikonio's storage facilities mentioned in the literature (Crowl, 2003; Mastellone et al., 2003; HSE, 1992 HSE, , 2002 CCPS, 1998; Nolan, 1996; Wingerden et al., 1995) . A general scheme describing possible measures that could be taken for potential accident prevention and control is shown in Figure 15 . In the light of our results, a vapour cloud explosion event is going to have the most severe consequences in the surroundings. Thus, it is quite reasonable to consider explosion mitigation measures as the most imperative ones.
CONCLUSIONS
Warehousing hazardous materials in port areas and marshalling yards poses a severe threat for nearby inhabited areas. At Ikonio=Piraeus port large quantities of dangerous cargoes are frequently unloaded and kept for intermediate storage in warehouses and yards in close proximity to a populated zone of Ikonio suburb.
Investigating the consequences of likely accidental events for the surroundings, a number of potential loss scenarios were developed and elaborated with appropriate quantitative risk assessment models. The results obtained lead to the following conclusions:
With regard to toxic chemical dispersion (scenarios 1 and 5), students and local inhabitants would be acutely affected very soon after release inception. The effect may be poisoning (anaesthesia, irritation of eyes and skin, lung injury), or may even be fatal for a significant proportion of the affected population, depending on the distance. A fireball event (scenario 2) would cause high degree burns in people in both block 5 and the school. Emitting radiation would endanger an area of approximately 225 m radius. In the case of formation and ignition of a flammable liquid pool (scenario 4), a neighboring container may also catch fire (domino). The thermal radiation emitted would induce burn injuries in humans at distances that were not in danger before the secondary ignition. In the case of an UVCE (scenario 3), the resulting overpressure would cause severe damage to nearby buildings, leading even to total collapse of some houses. Considerable lethal effect probability exists for both the adjacent buildings and the school.
To reduce the risk associated with the storage of dangerous chemicals, proper hazard minimization and mitigation measures should be taken. Some general recommendations are: the exclusion (or at least reduction of the quantities) of hazardous cargoes (toxic or flammable) that are unloaded and stored at the marshalling yard of Ikonio; and the reestablishment of emergency response planning taking into account the results of this study, in order to minimize the risk to the surrounding population. Such a plan should predict the evacuation of the greater area for major accidents.
Specific measures associated with fire and explosion potentialities (for which the most severe consequences are predicted for the public) may be considered: storage of sensitive materials in adequately separated detached buildings with incorporated damage limiting construction into the design (i.e. pressure resistant); elimination or control of all potential ignition sources inside the plant. This may require the use of proper electrical equipment and explosion-proof trucks in areas where there is the potential for a flammable=explosive atmosphere.
In general, the principles of inherent safety, such as the reduction of hazardous cargo quantities, are difficult to apply in marine transport facilities, due mainly to the fixed 
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RIGAS and SKLAVOUNOS sizes of the containers and the transport vessels. On the other hand, some protective measures (i.e. ignition source control) may be quite difficult and costly for a cargo transshipment area, and probably this will lead to the abeyance of their application. Therefore, the final conclusion of this work is that the relocation of the installations may be considered as the safest way to ensure public safety.
